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A MODEL TO ESTIMATE PRICE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MARKETS
TIlE BANK PRICING PROCESS
TO ESTIMATE the effect of market structure on the prices business
customers are charged, it is necessary to understand how banks
price their services. A pricing model for business services cannot
properly be developed in isolation from the other activities of
the bank. Strategies for pricing services and determining how
many and which services to supply businesses are affected by
the total set of opportunities that face the bank and the total
set of resources available to the bank. The development of a
strategy for pricing business services in this framework requires
a model which treats the entire banking firm as a system, but
a formal systems model of the bank is beyond the scope of this
study.' It will be necessary, however, to at least describe the
salient features of such a model to develop the required insights
It is worth noting that a number of large banks have developed linear pro-
gramming (LP) models as a solution algorithm for a similar but somewhat
narrower set of decisions. These models have been designed to guide bank asset
allocation decisions taking into account the capital constraint under which banks
operate. Two examples in the literature of such models are D. Chambers and
A. Charnes, "Intertemporal Analysis and Optimization of Bank Portfolios," Man-
agement Science, July 1901; and K. J. Cohen and F. S. Hammer, "Linear Pro-
gramming and Optimal Bank Asset Management Decisions," Journal of Finance,
May 1967. Although these LP models are prototypes of similar models that have
been used by banks to make decisions, this chapter contends that they have mis-
specified the true constraints under which banks operate. Equity capital is not
the constrained resource; rather it will be argued that the constraint is liquidity
during periods of tight monetary conditions and the requirement that banks meet
loan commitments to customers during such periods.Price Differences Between Markets 7
for studying the effects of structure on the bank's pricing
strategies.
It can be hypothesized that a bank's pricing decisions begin
with the specification of goals. A banker, like other entrepre-
neurs, may be motivated by a number of objectives.Itis
assumed, however, that as a single goal the banker strives to
maximize the discounted value of the bank's income stream over
a planning horizon. If other goals exist, the strategy described
could be modified to take these into account. It is further
assumed that banks are risk averters, which means the banker
must be compensated for any increase in risk. Moreover, the
risk aversion of bankers is relatively stronger than that of most
other business managers because of the low capital ratios main-
tained by banks and because of the emphasis bank examiners
place on loss experience as an index of the quality of manage-
ment. This high degree of risk aversion is, therefore, an extremely
influential element in the pricing and asset decisions of banks.
Like other firms, a bank begins with an endowment of equity.
It purchases raw materials and utilizes a production function to
convert these raw materials into products which it sells. Given
this description, a major difference between a bank and most
other enterprises is the fact that bank decisions in the factor
and product markets are circumscribed by regulatory prohibi-
tions.
The most important regulatory constraint on the pricing
strategy of banks is the prohibition of interest payments on
demand deposits. Deposits are a basic raw material in their pro-
duction function; hence, banks must develop strategies to com-
pete for these deposits, usually by lowering the price of services
rendered to compensate the customer for the value of deposits.
Since business customers purchase a wide range of bank products
and need deposits for transactions, they can be enticed to keep
deposits balances wherever they are reimbursed most satisfac-
torily. Thus, the bank and the business customer typically de-
velop a relationship in which bartering is an important com-
ponent. The prices of individual bank products are influenced8 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
by the deposit balance of the purchaser. But business customers
use a variety of products and all prices should not be reduced to
take account of the same deposits. Since the typical bank is
organized by departments along product lines,a customer
pricing algorithm must be developed to provide information to
individual departments of the banks on how much to offset its
prices on the products it provides.
This implies that the prohibition of interest on demand
deposits has forced banks to develop a pricing policy for the
total customer package rather than for each of its products
independently. However, there are good reasons to believe
that a package pricing policy would have developed in the
absence of this regulation and would continue if it is abolished.
Individual banks sell a wide range of products such as check
transfer, loans, trust and pension administration, stock transfer,
data processing services, etc., with varying demand elasticities
and, hence, varying profit margins on individual business cus-
tomers. It is reasonable to believe banks would find it desirable
to offset the prices of products where the bank faces low demand
elasticities in order to entice customers to purchase other prod-
ucts with a higher elasticity of demand.2 Since the lending
arrangement is the major focus for the business customer, the
bank takes account of profitable sales of its other products to
the customer in determining the loan price or other prices in
the package of services provided. This is especially the case
where there is a high probability the customer will shift all
purchases if he is enticed to switch the source of one of the
services. Thus, it is the nature of the customer-bank relationship
that forces a customer pricing policy. The bank will continue
to serve the customer if it believes him to be profitable over the
long run or planning horizon.
The need to accommodate the loan demand of profitable
customers, at the request of the customer, imposes opportunity
This is the traditional tied-sale strategy. For a discussion of the economies of
the tied-sale, see Meyer L. Burstein, "The Economics of Tie-in Sales," Review of
Economics and Statistics, February 1960, pp. 68—73.Price Differences Between Markets 9
costs on the bank. In general, the loan offer, which is often an
implicit rather than explicit part of the relationship, is made
subject to the prime bank rate which will exist when the loan
is requested. During periods of easy money, the bank can vail-.
date its loan commitments because of the interindustry variation
in the seasonal demand for loans by its business customers, or if
an unexpectedly large demand develops, it can easily acquire
additional funds at reasonable prices relative to the loan rate.
During periods of tight money, interindustry differences in
seasonal loan demands break down as higher than usual pro-
portions of customer request loans. In such periods, the marginal
cost of acquiring additional funds is relatively high compared to
easy money periods and the supply schedule of funds to any
individual bank becomes less elastic. The existence of Regulation
Qintensifiesthe potential problem a bank faces in acquiring
external funds during tight money periods by making the supply
schedule even less elastic than it would otherwise be. Because
the prime bank rate is sticky, the spread between loan rates and
purchased money costs declines and at times becomes negative.
Banks suffer large actual and/or opportunity losses on loans to
customers with whom they have profitable long-run relationships.
To reduce opportunity losses, the bank can maintain assets
which can be easily liquidated to meet the higher loan demand.
But, liquidity has a lower opportunity cost during periods of
easy money conditions. Thus, the bank must develop a liquidity
strategy based on the level of profits versus losses it is willing
to accept in easy or tight money periods.
To be profitable, the customer must compensate the bank
for the costs entailed in the loan commitment. Banks have
exhibited a strong desire to receive this compensation in the
form of deposit balances. This is explained by the high degree
of risk aversion of bank management due to low capital ratios.
The loan commitment to customers who are expected to be
profitable over the planning horizon imposes the major risk
undertaken by the bank. During periods of tight money, the
high cost of funds to meet such commitments could lead to10 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
substantial losses. Compensating deposits are the main source
of deposits at an assured price during periods of tight money.
They can, therefore, be viewed as a reciprocal insurance pre-
mium. On the one hand, they are a payment from the customer
to the bank to assure the granting of loan requests; on the other
hand, the bank accepts a lower payment in deposits rather than
cash fees to lower its risk exposure.
A CUSTOMER PROFITABILITY MODEL
A customer's expected profitability to a bank for a single period
of time can be expressed as follows :8
= L(R— — RR)CL + D(1 —rr)RA—YA+ E,(1)
where ir represents the dollars of profit from the ith customer during
period t; L, the loan balance of the ith customer during period t; R1L,
the loan rate for the ith customer's loan during period t; R4, the bank's
cost of acquiring a dollar of lendable funds during period t; R115, the
probability that the ith customer will default on the loan during period
i; CiL, the cost of making the ith customer loan, including credit search
and handling costs; D, the mean deposit balance of the ith customer
for period t; rr, the reserve requirement on demand deposits; Y1, the
change in average yield on assets during period t, because of liquidity
addition resulting from the loan commitment entailed by the ith cus-
tomer relationship; A, the total assets of the bank during period i; and
S13, the fees received for providing the jth type of service for the ith
customer during period t, minus the costs incurred in providing the
service.
The expression L (BL —— R)—C4Lrepresents the net
'The customer profit formulation is presented in this manner because of the
estimation requirements of the study. A bank decision framework would call for
the development of a linear, chance constrained, or dynamic programming model.
The bank maximizes the discounted value of its income stream given its demand
schedule, supply schedule, and production. Moreover, it operates subject to a
policy decision on the quantity of risk management will accept, which is the
probability of liquidity costs, losses on liquidating securities, and opportunity
losses due to the need to purchase high cost money to meet loan requests during
periods of tight money conditions.Price Differences Between Markets 11
revenue expected from the loan component of the customer
relationship. The RL is the real rate implied by the loan con-
tract. Because of repayment clauses or interest prepayment
clauses this may be different from the rate stipulated in the
contract.
In principle, the RA term should not be the marginal cost of
funds during the one period t, but should be evaluated after
taking into account all alternatives available to the bank through
the planning horizon.4 RA is also the opportunity cost of funds
to the bank. Even if two banks have identical cost of funds
schedules, in terms of payments made to external suppliers, they
may have different RA terms because of variations in the oppor-
tunities they face in using their available funds. The RA term is
really the shadow price or dual variable of lendable funds when
this problem is viewed in a mathematical programming format.
Since all banks face identical supply schedules in the securities
market, differences in opportunities are functions of the loan
markets. Banks in different markets have varying loan demands
because of strong or weak savings and loan or mutual savings
bank competition for mortgages, variations in the competitive
fervor of sales finance and small loan companies for consumer
loans, and the intensity of competition from other banks in the
business lending sphere. The difference in the RA term will
produce measured differences in the zrbetweenmarkets, if
market structure is related to the prices businesses are charged
for services.
In banking, it is usual to think of the RR term as the differ-
ence between the prime rate and the rate charged. This simplistic
view of bank pricing is countered by the concept of a customer
'This is the problem that arises in capital budgeting when the firm faces an
upward sloping cost of capital. If the entire set of projects available through the
planning horizon is not included in the analysis, projects evaluated at an early
point in the decision process face a lower cost of capital than those at a later
point. Because of this simultaneous solution process, an optimum decision can
only be made when all investment alternatives and the cost of funds schedules,
through' the planning horizon, are viewed concurrently. This problem isalso
solved by a linear programming solution algorithm; see William J. Baumol and
Richard E. Quandt, "Investment and Discount Rates Under Capital Rationing:
A Programming Approach," The Economic Journal, June 1965, pp. 317—329.12 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
relationship where the price of any product cannot be isolated
from the other prices in the package. In this formulation, it is
assumed that the sum of RR payments just compensates the
bank for losses experienced. Thus, this sum is subtracted from
the net revenue expected from borrowing customers.
The C(L term includes both the direct costs incurred in
processing the loan forms and monitoring the loan agreement
during the periods in which loans to the ith customer are out-
standing and also the costs incurred in monitoring the credit
position of the customer when loans are not outstanding. Thus,
this term has a positive value forall borrowing customers
during all periods.
In any period, therefore, the expression L4 (R4L—— RR)
—Ccould have a positive or negative contribution to profits.
When loans are outstanding during periods of monetary ease,
this component of the relationship almost always produces a
positive contribution. A rare exception could occur where the
lending component of the relationship is very small relative to
deposits maintained or where the customer purchases other
profitable products, causing the bank to make loans at unusually
low rates. During periods of tight money, a negative value could
occur for a large number of customers. During such periods it is
not unusual for RA to be greater than RL.
The term D (1 —rr) RA represents the value received from
the customer's deposit balance. Reserves must be subtracted
from deposits to determine balances available to the bank. The
appropriateness of using only the single parameter, average
balance, to denote D is open to some question because of the
value a bank puts on the certainty of having the deposit when
required. It may be desirable to add a penalty term for wide
variations within the period. Using RA as a measure of the value
of a dollar of demand deposit balances held by borrowing cus-
tomers probably understates the true worth of these deposits.
They have a high probability of being available during periods
of peak needs and are, therefore, more valuable, on the average,
than funds derived from more volatile sources.Price Differences Between Markets 13
The term Y4 A, which is the change in revenue from the bank's
assets not including revenues from the ith customer's loans,
accounts for the cost imposed on the bank in the form of a
reduced return on assets because of the implicit or explicit
commitment to accommodate the loan requests of the customer.
During periods when the customer is borrowing the maximum
amount the bank will loan, this term will be zero. The size of
the sum of YA for the entire bank is determined by the amount
of risk the bank management is willing to assume. Banks which
have large YA costs will experience small losses due to high
costs of purchased funds during periods of high loan demand,
when tight money conditions prevail. The large YA cost is due
to substantial holdings of short dated securities which provide
liquidity but impose a penalty on the current period's revenue.
Banks which have small amounts of such liquid assets will
experience large losses during periods of peak loan demand.
Such banks have invested funds not employed in loans in longer
term investments, which cause capital losses during tight money
periods, or they have high loan to deposit ratios during periods
of easy money conditions and are required to purchase high
cost funds or turn away good customers during periods of high
loan demand.
The term S ,representsthe sum of fees received by the
bank from the charges levied on the nonlending services per-
formed for the ith customer during period t, minus the costs
incurred in providing these services. Since deposit balances are
often used to compensate the bank for these services, many
customers, even large users of such services, will make small
or even no payments of fees and the coefficients of the Si's will
often be negative.
It has been stressed that the bank is a long-run profit maxi-
mizer. Thus, for any period t, ircouldhave a positive or nega-
tive coefficient and still the customer could be acceptable. To
determine if a customer is expected to be profitable, the com-
puted profits for all periods through the planning horizon must14 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
be discounted at an appropriate rate and summed. The present




where K is a discount factor which equates the value of money
in different periods.
The appropriate discount rate to equate earnings in future
periods to a present value is a subject of wide controversy. For
our purposes, it issufficient to note that long-run customer
profitability cannot be determined by simply adding income
streams across periods. Money has a time value. Income received
in early periods can be utilized to earn additional returns. More-
over, funds available in different periods have varying values
depending on the relative opportunities available during the
period.
If it is assumed that the bank's criterion function is to maxi-
mize the value of its discounted long-run profits, equations 1
and 2 fit into a simple decision rule. If the present value of the
discounted stream of expected earnings is positive, the customer
should be served. If the stream is negative, the customer should
be rejected.
If the model of bank pricing behavior developed in equations
1 and 2 describes pricing policies of banks, then it contains
implications on how an empirical investigation of the relation-
ship of bank market structure to prices charged must proceed.
The model implies that profit maximizing decisions on whether
or not to serve a customer are determined by an estimate of
over-all customer profitability, which largely depends upon the
net revenues from nonloan services the customer is expected to
purchase and the expected cyclical distribution of the customer's
loan demand and deposit balances. Observed individual prices
may be affected by the profitability of other portions of the
packages of services purchased by the customer. Potentially highPrice Differences Between Markets 15
profit customers are in a strong position to bargain for a reduc-
tion in the price of some individual products. If the customer's
profitability is marginal, the bank is in a strong position to raise
some individual product prices in the package of services per-
formed.
When a package pricing concept is introduced, the question
of price differences between markets is transformed into differ-
ences in the profitability at which customers will be accepted.
But, even this relatively difficult formulation has been shown to
inadequately describe the complexity of the problem. The
profitability computation extends over a number of periods. A
customer's total contribution could produce a lossin some
periods and still have a positive expected value over the planning
horizon. The experimental design suggested by equations 1 and 2
is not feasible for empirical estimation of market performance.
It would be prohibitively expensive to collect data required to
estimate customer profitability over an extended time period,
for the necessary number of customers, distributed over the
necessary range of market concentrations and types of branching
restrictions, to determine if market structure affects customer
profitability.
Because of the excessive data costs of a multiperiod model,
it is necessary to develop a one-period model to estimate the
market structure parameters. Equation 1,in isolation,is an
example of such a model. It implies that the bank takes into
account all of a customer's activities in a single period to deter-
mine profitability. In light of the model developed in both
equations, which argued that profit maximizing decisions on
acceptable customers should be predicated on expectations of
a long-term profitable relationship, it is necessary to justify the
use of parameters estimated from a one-period model. The use-
fulness of a one-period model depends upon a demonstration
that biases are not introduced. The question of bias must be
posed with regard to the purpose of the parameter estimates.
One-period estimates would certainly not be reliable for profit-
ability decisions by bank management, but this study is not16 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
involved in guiding individual bank decisions on profitable cus-
tomer relationships. The customer models are designed to provide
estimates of prices charged businesses for services in different
bank markets as a starting point for an analysis of market struc-
ture effects. The question of bias then reduces to whether or not
parameter estimates of the one-period model are related to
structurevariablesdifferently than the parametersofthe
N-period model.
The parameter values of many of the elements of the customer
relationship vector would be expected to change with cyclical
phase. This isparticularly true of the deposit balance and
liquidity cost variables and least true of the estimates of net
income derived from other services. But this study is not con-
cerned with determining which customers should be served
by a bank. Since all customers for whom we have data have
been accepted for a relationship by a bank, for our purposes all
that is required is that cyclical changes in the customer char-
acteristic parameters not be influenced by market structure
variations. Cyclical influences have a broad effect on the economy
and have a differential impact on industries. Industries are to
some degree concentrated regionally and bank market struc-
ture is also related to region, but there is no strong reason to
believe that these relationships will introduce a bias into the
empirical estimates. It is extremely unlikely that the industrial
distribution of the sample of customers which was chosen in
the set of SMSA's with one of the three types of branching
restrictions is affected by the business cycle differently than
the distribution of customers in the other two sets of SMSA's.
It is concluded, therefore, that if banks price their business
services to maximize long-run profits, a one-period model, such
as equation 1, can be used to estimate the influence of market
structure on profitability.
Since our interest is in prices charged rather than in customer
profitability, and because some of the variables will be represented
by a proxy because data are not available to measure them
directly, equation 1 is restructured as follows:Price Differences Between Markets 17
=B1L+ B2D + B3F + B4T + B&LA + BOAA
N M
+ B7E + B8S + EBG1+ U,(3) i9j1
where RL, L, D, and S are defined as in equation 1; F is the fluctuation
in depositor balances; T, the time in debt in months; LA, the length of
customer arrangement; AA, the account activity; E, another bank; and
G1, variables depicting the individual bank, market demand, and
market structure.
This model is similar to (1) in that it implies that the bank
makes decisions based on a single period. The major difference
is that the loan rate is assumed to be the major price which the
bank uses to determine profitability of the customer. The net
revenues received on other products in the package of services,
the direct costs and opportunity costs entailed in the customer
relationship, and the value of the deposits are assumed to influ-
ence the price charged for the loan.,
In (3) the cost associated with the loan function and the risk
assumed in lending to the customer are imbedded in the loan
size variable, L. Other customer characteristics included in the
model, such as deposit fluctuation, time in debt, length of
customer arrangement, and account activity, are proxies for
factors that influence the costs' or revenues of the customer
relationship that would be captured directly in the measured
variables if equations 1 and 2 were estimated. These variables
can be expected to influence the terms of the relationship in (1)
and are, therefore, included.
The variables included in the G5 terms are proxies for RA.
Since this study was originally motivated by the desire to
measure the parametersof the price-structurerelationship,
special interestis attached to the sign,size, and statistical
significance of two of these variables, which will be a measure
of concentration of ownership of deposits in the market and a
dummy variable to capture the effect of branching restrictions.
The YA term in equation 1 is deleted because there is no way
to capture the effect of required liquidity for the individual
customer.18 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
The significance of equation 3, with loan rate designated as
the crucial price of bank services, derives both from the fact
that interest on loans is the major source of bank revenue and
because loan rates have been used as the dependent variable
in all other studies of the effect of market structure on price.
Thus, the estimates derived from this model describe an im-
portant component of bank prices and can be compared to the
findings of other studies.
For the purpose of this study, however, interest rates have
a severe shortcoming because observed loan prices fluctuate
within a very narrow range. Whatever the explanation for this,
it is an observed fact that at the time of the customer survey
interest rates on business loans were very rarely above 10 per
cent or below the prime rate, which was 5.5 or 5.75 per cent.
Moreover, the rates strongly cluster around 6 per cent (see
column 2 in Table 1). The narrow range of the distribution of
interest rates on business loans is not a manifestation of the
particular set of banks and customers surveyed for this study,
rather it is a general phenomenon of bank pricing. This same
general distribution is found in many surveys of interest rates
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SOURCE: Column 2, National Bureau Survey of Bank Customer Profiles; columns 4
and 5, Federal Quarterly Survey of Interest Rates, Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1967,
p. 1392.Price Differences Between Markets 19
on loans for business purposes. Some examples are shown in
columns 4 and 5 of Table 1. The two parts of Table 1, columns
1 and 2 and columns 3, 4, and 5, are more nearly identical than
they. at first appear. The customer profile data are unweighted;
whereas, the Federal Reserve data are weighted by dollar
amounts. Since larger loans have lower rates, the Federal
Reserve survey should have a higher proportion than the cus-
tomer profile in the lower rate brackets.
The narrow range of observed interest rates on business loans,
coupled with the strong tendency tocluster around some
"normal" rate and its extreme cyclical stickiness, strongly infers
that the determination of the loan rate has a large non-
systematic component. Discussions with bankers and the litera-
ture on bank management give the strong impression that rules
of thumb and tradition play an important part in setting loan
rates. Thus, there can be substantial movements in the inde-
pendent variables that are not reflected in the loan rate. This
is, of course, a problem of major concern for the empirical
portions of this study and will be considerably elaborated in
the next chapter.
The implication of equations 1 and 2 that banks are remuner-
ated through three types of payments suggests that models
similar to (3) should be formulated with deposit balances and
fees designated as the dependent variable. But at this time
fees are of relatively minor importance. Thus, only one additional
equation will be constructed and estimated.
To measure the relationship of the deposit balance component
of the vector of bank prices to market structure, equation 3 is
reformulated as follows:
D =B1L+ B2RL + B3F + B4T + B6LA + B6A4
N M
+ B7E + B8S + BG1 + U,(4)
i..9j..1
where all variables are defined as in (3).
This formulation of the model has much to commend it. The
deposit balance is one of the most significant components of the20 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
customer-bank relationship. Conversations with bankers suggest
that it is very often the crucial bargaining point of the relation-
ship, particularly during periods of strong loan demand. Deposit
balances impose a cost upon the business. Even if the balances
are voluntarily held and there is increasing evidence that they
are largely determined by bank compensation requirements, the
business could bargain for additional bank services. Certainly,
to the bank, the amount of balances maintained is an important
component of the revenue received.
In the following chapter, the parameters of the variables in
equations 3 and 4 will be estimated from the customer profile
data collected for this study. The basic hypothesis of the study
is that the prices of bank services paid by the business customers
of banks are determined by components of the package of bank
services purchased and the conditions of the banking market
in which the customers are served. Thus, taking account of vari-
ations in customer profiles with regard to services used and
differences in demand in the market, variations in the level of
prices are attributed to market structure. The parameter values
and the signs of the coefficients of the two structural variables
will be analyzed to determine if prices are related to market
structure and, if a relationship is established, to determine the
quantitative importance of the structural variables on the level
of prices businesses pay.